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Neoslavery-"Surrogate" Motherhood Contracts v.
The Thirteenth Amendment
Lorraine Stone*
The Baby M case' has gripped the nation for more than two
years. Not limited to the parties involved, it concerns us all. The
issues raised and the decisions reached are critical because they
touch on a host of other, related issues. The advent of artificial
manipulation of human reproduction challenges and redefines age-
old social norms. Considering its importance, it would seem pru-
dent to tread carefully, to stick close to familiar landmarks, to
laws developed by trial and error over centuries. Judge Harvey
Sorkow did exactly the opposite in his decision. Clearly eager to
award custody to the Sterns, Judge Sorkow declared existing laws
inapplicable, disregarded them, and proceeded to judicially legis-
late on his own. In so doing, he may have opened an incredible
and potentially disastrous can of worms: legalization of male and
female prostitution, creation of an "incubator" class of women, and
the reinstitution of facets of slavery. But more of that later.
Judge Sorkow was asked to decide three issues. First, since
Mary Beth Whitehead was described as a "surrogate" mother,
what is a surrogate mother and what legal rights does such a
mother have respecting her offspring? Second, was the contract
the Sterns and Mrs. Whitehead entered into legal, and therefore
binding? Third, what is best for the child?
Judge Sorkow apparently ignored the first two issues. More-
over, it is arguable that the facts bearing on the third were never
aired; that Mrs. Whitehead, the modern Dred Scott, was largely
convicted in the press; and that Judge Sorkow may have based his
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1. In re Baby M, 217 N.J. Super. 313, 525 A.2d 1128 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1987), aff'd in part and rev 'd in part, 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988).
Law and Inequality
decision on social class and personal prejudice rather than on an
objective analysis of the facts and proper application of law.
As these issues are vital, and will become more so as time
goes on and society is inevitably confronted with variations on the
Baby M theme, it might be wise to examine this pilot case more
closely, bearing in mind that there is no quick fix; that the only
way to tackle this Gordian knot is on a point-by-point basis.
First, throughout, Mrs. Whitehead has been titled a "surro-
gate" mother. What, precisely, is a surrogate? Words have clear
definitions. These definitions must be adhered to so as to avoid
confusion that can destroy any hope of rational resolution. We can-
not play fast and loose with the dictionary, altering meanings to
suit convenience, without dire consequences. So how does Mr.
Webster, and his New World Dictionary of the American Lan-
guage, define "surrogate"? Surrogate: A deputy or substitute.
There is no question Mrs. Whitehead is the genetic, biological
female parent, i.e. the mother, of Baby M. She cannot, by defini-
tion, be a "surrogate," as she is not a "substitute" or "deputy." If
we ask, "Will the real surrogate mother please rise?" Elizabeth
Stern, the adoptive mother, the stand-in for the genuine article,
must rise. No verbal contortions can alter the biological fact that
Mrs. Whitehead is the mother, the whole mother, and nothing but
the mother, despite linguistic efforts to distort or obscure the
truth.
Judge Sorkow chose to ignore her maternity in his opinion.
All efforts seem marshalled toward masking her motherhood be-
hind a verbal smokescreen. The applicable term is "railroading."
Like it or not, Mrs. Whitehead's blood flows in Melissa Stern's
veins, her heritage is stamped in Melissa's genes, and her son and
daughter are Melissa's half-brother and half-sister. Nothing can
change that.
Second, was the contract a legal, binding one? One does not
need a law degree to realize that the New Jersey circus should
never have seen a courtroom. The thirteenth amendment to the
Constitution of the United States, the beating heart of the Repub-
lic, outlawed slavery in the United States, along with all ancillary,
contingent, and supportive activities.
As the ink dried on General Lee's surrender, two parties
could never again contract with each other for the purchase and
sale of a third. Such was the substance and spirit of emancipation,
concepts secured via a national bloodbath whose bitter conse-
quences have rocked and scarred the United States since. The
only victories won in that agony were the preservation of the
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Union and the abolition of the legal right of two persons to com-
mercially transfer (sell) another.
Until now.
The "surrogate" mother contract, unilaterally and arbitrarily
validated by Judge Sorkow, reinstated the right of one person to
contract with a second for the purchase and sale of the body and
services (in this case, the filial love of a child for its parents) of a
third. Simply stated, the Sterns entered into a contract with Mrs.
Whitehead for the production, purchase, and sale of an infant
human being. The gist of the contract was that the Sterns agreed
to pay Mrs. Whitehead ten thousand dollars to conceive, carry, and
deliver a baby. In return, Mrs. Whitehead agreed to sign over her
parental rights to the resultant child to the Sterns. What occurred
is obvious. All parties engaged in a contract to produce, buy, and
sell a person in clear violation of the thirteenth amendment to the
Constitution. Far from entering a legal contract, it actually ap-
pears they engaged in a criminal act. That Mrs. Whitehead subse-
quently decided to reject the money, not to sell her infant, not to
violate the Constitution, logically seems commendable, not damna-
ble. The vilification of Mrs. Whitehead was unjustified. If this case
did come before a court, it should have come before a criminal
court, not a civil court-the Sterns were seeking to enforce a bla-
tant illegality.
Third, what is best for the child? It may never be possible to
know the answer for Baby M, given the sensationalism and public-
ity accorded the case.
Clearly, however, Mrs. Whitehead was not given a fair, im-
partial hearing. Much was made of her socio-economic status com-
pared with the Sterns. Judge Sorkow fairly waxed poetic over the
prospects of a child raised in the home of two doctors compared
with that of a high school dropout and a recovered alcoholic who is
a traumatized Viet Nam veteran. It is true that the Sterns are
richer than the Whiteheads, which is why they were able to "com-
mission" the baby and buy her in the first place. Greater education
and more money, while they may indicate a richer lifestyle, guar-
antee nothing. More than one recovered alcoholic have produced
healthy, happy, productive, even heroic, offspring, while many up-
percrusters have turned out real losers. "The inglorious sons of
great fathers" are nothing new.
Beyond this, there is the deprivation visited upon the child le-
gally decreed shorn of her siblings, uncles, aunts, cousins and
grandparents-her entire natural family; the child who, by judicial
fiat, is robbed of her heritage to accede to the demand for closed
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adoption, for sole, exclusionary custody. It is eminently proper to
ask if this is truly "in the best interests of the child."
There is no denying that cash and class played hefty roles in
Judge Sorkow's decision to award Baby M to the Sterns; to grant
immediate adoption by Elizabeth Stern; to reward members of his
own socio-economic class at the expense of Mrs. Whitehead, who
patently belonged to another class in our classless society.
It is interesting to see how this decision was reached. Mrs.
Whitehead's psychological state was examined under a public mi-
croscope. Psychologists by the carload (oddly, of the same class as
both Judge Sorkow and the Sterns) testified that she was "overly
involved" with her children. She was accused of being "too protec-
tive," "hugging too much," and being too dominating an influence.
It is fair to ask, "How much is too much?"
For example, she was declared "too involved in her children's
lives" because she braided her daughter Tuesday's hair each morn-
ing. Why is braiding an eleven-year-old's hair an evil influence?
Indeed, failure to properly supervise and involve herself in her
daughter's toilet could more readily be termed neglect.
Almost every accusation levelled against Mrs. Whitehead's
"interference" in her children's lives has been extolled, in other
contexts, as praiseworthy devotion. The mother who refuses her
underage son permission to join the army "interferes." So does
the mother who refuses permission for a thirteen-year-old daugh-
ter to wed. Even the mother who deems it unwise for a child to
work after school, and withholds consent for working papers, "in-
terferes" in her child's life. Any parent who denies a child permis-
sion to purchase a much coveted item, be it a candy bar or a
Cadillac, interferes with the child. History abounds with such pa-
rental interference. This is not usually labelled "psychopathic,"
"manipulative" behavior, but is recognized as responsible parental
devotion. Failure to behave in such a manner always has been
viewed as gross neglect of duty.
Finally, Mrs. Whitehead was convicted-right word-of insta-
bility in endangering Baby M when she slipped her baby out a win-
dow and fled with her to Florida.
A desperate mother, threatened with separation from her
child, fleeing the duly constituted authority snapping at her heels,
is the stuff of drama. The most famous instance springing in-
stantly to mind is Eliza in Uncle Tom's Cabin,2 who grabs her son,
Harry, and jumps from ice floe to ice floe in a frantic effort to es-
2. Harriet Beecher Stowe, Uncle Tom's Cabin (Ann Douglas ed. 1981) (1852).
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cape capture and the separation from her child the capture will
bring.3 Eliza's action imperilled Harry's life, yet Eliza is seen as
the definition of maternal heroism and love. In fleeing, Mrs.
Whitehead did as Eliza had done, at far less risk to her infant.
Why is one a heroine and the other "emotionally unstable" and
"manipulative"?
It does not matter that one was a mid-nineteenth century
black slave and the other a late-twentieth century white woman
who had unlawfully sold her right to her child prior to its concep-
tion and birth. Whatever their legalistic differences, both Eliza
and Whitehead took flight for exactly the same reason: to avoid
having their children snatched from their breasts. Eliza fled from
a slavecatcher with the authority of the laws of the State of Ken-
tucky guaranteeing him a right to his bought-and-paid-for prop-
erty. Whitehead fled from her child's father, with Judge Sorkow
and the power of the Superior Court of the State of New Jersey
seeking the child Mr. Stern had bargained for, seeking enforce-
ment by specific performance of a blatantly illegal contract. As
the New Jersey Supreme Court unanimously found, the fact that
one of the parties in the Whitehead instance was the father of the
child in no way mitigated the illegality of the contractual arrange-
ment. It did not and could not mitigate the consequently unlawful
nature of the seizure of the child from her natural and fit mother.
Eliza and Harry were fictional characters. But almost all fic-
tion is based on fact. There probably was an Eliza-like incident
upon which Harriet Beecher Stowe based this episode. There were
probably many incidents of desperate women daring anything to
avoid enduring the agony of having their children ripped, however
legally, from them. Slave mothers sometimes killed their children,
and themselves, to prevent such separations, as Mrs. Whitehead
threatened to do. She may have been bluffing. She may have lied
in threatening to accuse Mr. Stern of molesting her daughter.
Desperate mothers have ever done desperate things where their
children are concerned. Such desperate acts were well known in
the antebellum South, and were a persuasive reason for the aboli-
tion of slavery. The slave mothers were viewed as the most
grievously injured victims, their unnatural separation from their
young an abomination so gross an insult to nature and nature's
God as to incite the vengeance of heaven itself, and require a blood
reckoning to expiate, a prophesy that proved tragically accurate.
Viewed in this light, Mrs. Whitehead's flight with her baby in
her arms is no different from Eliza's with Harry. Although Mrs.
3. Id. at 117-20.
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Whitehead may indeed have consented to the contract, it was not,
and by its very nature could not have been, an informed consent.
Yet never during the trial was Mrs. Whitehead given a chance to
tell her side, to acquaint His Honor with a basic fact of all mamma-
lian life: a mother forms a natural, deep bond with her young.
Evolution, God, or both instilled this bond for a purpose. It
exists despite manmade and man-interpreted laws that seek to
deny its existence and abrogate its effects. Zoologists and anthro-
pologists, if not jurists, affirm the existence of such a bond. But
anyone who has owned a pet that has had young knows it without
esoteric schooling. Anyone who has had the sad experience of
owning a dog whose puppies have died knows the mother is devas-
tated. The same is no less true of humans. Taking a baby from its
mother usually, not always, but usually, has the same effect. To
the mother, the child is the same as dead, and the mourning for a
dead child never ceases. It is worse, perhaps, since the mother re-
mains forever unaware of her child's fate and the uncertainty is an
exquisite torture.
Aside from Mrs. Whitehead's psychological state, not yet ob-
jectively evaluated, along with the Sterns' psychological states,
never examined as closely or as negatively as the Whiteheads',
what kind of family life would the Whiteheads have provided?
At the time of trial, the Whitehead family consisted of Mr.
and Mrs. Whitehead, grandparents and a half-brother and half-sis-
ter to the baby, several aunts, uncles, and cousins in a seemingly
close family, and family friends. Consummately ordinary. The
Sterns, on the other hand, had each other, and several friends.
They had music and Tolstoy and far more money than the White-
heads. But money, Judge Sorkow assured us, was not the deciding
factor.
What would be best for Baby M really remained unclear as of
the decision date. Given the subsequent separation of the White-
heads, possibly due to the pressures placed on their marriage by
the glare of intense, adverse, unrelenting, negative public scrutiny,
the question is now moot. The home they might have provided has
been destroyed, crushed, perhaps by the weight of cameras, sound
equipment and printing presses. It is too late for the Whiteheads,
and the Sterns' partial victory on appeal was somewhat aided by
the default of the Whitehead marriage. But the issues transcend
the individuals and will surely arise again in other cases. Society
must be prepared for that inevitability.
This case is of intense public interest for many reasons, and
affects an array of vital social concerns. For example, there is the
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indisputable paternity of Mr. Stern. But Mr. Stern is not married
to Mrs. Whitehead, so Baby M is a child born outside the wedlock
of her parents, and she may be considered an illegitimate child.
Moreover, an intriguing new development has transpired.
Mrs. Whitehead has had another baby, and the father, Dean
Gould, was not her husband at the time the baby was conceived.
Prior to Mrs. Whitehead's marriage to Dean Gould, therefore,
Baby M stood in exactly the same position as this infant, both chil-
dren fathered by men not Mrs. Whitehead's legal mate. Many in
the media and legal communities voiced outrage at Mrs. White-
head's "immorality" in having a child by a man other than her
husband. The hypocrisy is obvious. It is grossly illogical to suggest
that conception of a baby naturally and out of love is less "moral"
than one conceived artificially and for profit.
For millennia manmade law has taken great pains to protect
the father, his fortune, and especially his estate, from the claim of
the illegitimate child via the, until recently, legal designation of
such children as "bastards." Only within this century have any
real steps been taken to right this ancient wrong, with the enact-
ment of the Uniform Parentage Act in some seventeen of the fifty
states.4 The Uniform Parentage Act provides, in essence, that all
parents, regardless of their marital state, have the same rights and
obligations to their children.5 Although New Jersey has a Uni-
form Parentage Act, it was never cited by either side during the
trial. This was not a trial for custody of a human infant. Rather, it
was a trial to enforce by specific performance the terms of a com-
mercial contract; an attempt by the "purchaser" to force the "ven-
dor" to deliver the "product" bargained for. Melissa Stern, in this
scenario, was robbed of her humanity and reduced to a contracted-
for object, clearly violating the thirteenth amendment to the Fed-
eral Constitution.
Over the centuries, manmade law has carefully vested all re-
4. See Alabama, Ala. Code §§ 26-17-1 to 26-17-21 (1975); California, Cal. [Civil]
Code §§ 7000-7018 (West 1983); Colorado, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 19-6-101 to 19-6-129
(1986); Delaware, Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, §§ 8017818 (Supp. 1986); Hawaii, Haw. Rev.
Stat. §§ 584-1 to 584-26 (1985); Illinois, Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 40, 2501-2526 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1988); Kansas, Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 38-1110 to 38-1129 (1986); Minnesota,
Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 257.51-257.74 (West 1982); Missouri, Mo. Ann. Stat. §§ 210.817-
210.852 (Vernon Supp. 1988); Montana, Mont. Code Ann. §§ 40-6-101 to 40-6-135
(1986); Nevada, Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 126.011-126.391 (1986); New Jersey, N.J. Stat.
Ann. §§ 9:17-38 to 9:17-59 (West Supp. 1988); North Dakota, N.D. Cent. Code §§ 14-
17-01 to 14-17-26 (1981); Ohio, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 3111.01-3111.19 (Anderson
Supp. 1987); Rhode Island, R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 15-8-1 to 15-8-27 (Supp. 1981); Wash-
ington, Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 26.26.010-26.26.905 (1986); Wyoming, Wyo. Stat.
§§ 14-2-101 to 14-2-120 (1977).
5. See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 9:17-38 (West Supp. 1987).
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sponsibility-custodial, legal, economic-for the illegitimate child
in the mother. Absent incontestable proof that they are unfit,
"surrogate" (birth) mothers, actually the mothers of illegitimate
children, should not be required to relinquish what amounts to
their total custodial rights to the father and adoptive (true surro-
gate) mother.
Mrs. Whitehead was never accused of being unfit. If she were
alleged an unfit mother for Baby M, she would logically be unfit to
retain custody of her other three children, and steps would have to
be taken to remove them from her. No such steps were ever
contemplated.
A cynical old axiom holds that laws are made to protect and
benefit those who make them. Judge Sorkow's decision abrogated
all custodial rights of the unmarried mother which man has, for
the convenience and the safety of his estate, vested in her from an-
tiquity. Those rights are inconvenient in these altered circum-
stances. In so doing, Judge Sorkow, in effect, vested parents with
an economically valuable property right in the custody of the per-
sons of their children. He asserted the right of persons to comnmis-
sion the production and exchange of babies for a contractually
agreed dollar amount. This creates a class of persons who are, ef-
fectively, commercially transferable commodities, a class non-exis-
tent in the United States since the surrender at Appomattox
Courthouse in 1865.
To justify his decision, Judge Sorkow cited the property right
men have in selling their sperm, reasoning that women therefore
have a collateral right to rent their wombs.6 The counterpart of
the sperm, however, is the ovum, not the uterus. Neither sperm
nor ovum is viable or valuable without access to a uterus, an abso-
lute prerequisite, in-which a conceptus can develop. So it was vital
to decree that women have the right to rent their uteri. But this is
a transparent charade. Nature endows but one purpose for the
uterus: the development of a fetus from conception to birth. No
one is interested in the uterus itself as "rental property"; rather
they are interested in what the uterus produces. The uterus has
only two possible products, menstrual fluid or a baby, and it is
doubtful anyone truly wants a woman's menstrual fluid.
By extension, if women have the right to rent their uteri,
they must also have a right to rent access to it. Nowhere did the
judge define whether such access may be achieved naturally or ar-
tificially, nor did he define the time span of such rental. So wo-
men have an absolute right to rent their uteri, and natural or
6. In re Baby M, 217 N.J. Super. at 388, 525 A.2d at 1165.
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artificial access to it, for months or minutes as they choose, which
no policing agency can interdict. If upheld by the United States
Supreme Court, this decision logically legalizes female prostitution
in all fifty states, the Territories, the District of Columbia, and the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Further, since women have the
right to rent their reproductive apparatus, men must have the
same right.
The male organ corresponding to the vaginal tract, nature's
access to the uterus, is the penis. Men would have the right to
rent their penises to whomever and under whatever circumstances
they choose. Making homosexual and heterosexual prostitution a
legal right would, ironically, convert the loathsome pimp into a re-
spectable rental agent.
Whatever one's opinion on legalized prostitution, in view of
the danger of spreading venereal diseases, and AIDS especially, so
critical an issue deserves a more cautious approach than would be
possible if Judge Sorkow's opinion became the law of the land.
In order to find for the Sterns, to enforce the "surrogate"
mother contract, and to deprive Mrs. Whitehead of her parental
rights to a child indisputably hers, it is necessary to vest parents
with a transferable property right in the custody of their offspring.
This creates-or recreates-a class of saleable persons (minors) in
flagrant violation of the Constitution, making a mockery of the
worst war in the history of the United States. The repercussions
of this decision may make prostitution a right, and possibly create
a breeder class of women to "incubate" the offspring of the
wealthy who cannot or would rather not bear their own children.
Especially vulnerable are poor girls and women. No law ex-
ists to protect them from the already perfected technology permit-
ting the routine mixing of the sperm and ovum and implantation
of fertilized eggs of the wealthy in the uteri of such women. Wit-
ness the recent surrogate gestation of triplets in South Africa by
Mrs. Pat Anthony utilizing the egg of her daughter, Karen Fer-
reira-Jorge, fertilized with the sperm of her son-in-law, Alcino.7
In this instance, it was done out of love. But what is done for love
can be done for money unless doing so for pecuniary gain is ren-
dered criminal. It should also be borne in mind that Mrs.
Anthony, in her own words, described herself as nothing more
than an "incubator." Not a person, but a developmental vessel for
fetal growth. The chillingly dehumanizing implications of this atti-
tude, for all women, but especially for the more vulnerable poor,
7. Eric Levin & Sue Reid, Motherly Love Works a Miracle, People 38 (Oct. 19,
1987).
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should it become an acceptable viewpoint, must be regarded with
the gravest foreboding.
There is historical precedent for the use of the bodies of poor,
especially black, women by wealthy whites to perform similar nat-
ural functions. It was a common southern practice to use black
women as wet-nurses to suckle white babies, allowing white ladies
to "preserve the shape of their breasts" by assigning the nursing of
their infants to black "mammies." Similarly, using poor women as
"incubators" would permit wealthy women to become genetic
mothers, like Karen Ferreira-Jorge, while preserving their figures,
colonizing the bodies of poor women to produce their babies.
Black women have historically been used as care-givers to white
children. They may be drafted to care for white children before
birth as well as after.
Carrying this to the extreme, it may even be possible to by-
pass poor women of any hue, and, more cheaply, impregnate or im-
plant a fertilized ovum in the uterus of a physically healthy,
mentally retarded or autistic woman. There is little protection for
an incompetent woman, legally in the same position as a minor, if
her legal guardian deems it in her best economic interest to be re-
peatedly impregnated for money. Menarche occurs at about age
thirteen, menopause at about fifty-three. Such a woman could "go
on line" in late childhood and be "productive" for about forty
years, all justified by her guardian as the only way she could be
self-supporting. With the guardian, perhaps, reaping an agency
fee. Such a scenario, with women treated like farm animals, could
occur without regulation.
These are a few of the grave consequences the Pandora's Box
of Judge Sorkow's decision, if upheld, might have unleashed upon
us. In venturing into the realm of manipulation of the basic cell of
human reproduction, science is also necessarily tampering with the
basic cell of human society-the family. It behooves us to tread
cautiously and gingerly on this volatile, unknown ground, using,
and amending where necessity indicates, the known guidelines of
the ages. We cannot afford to pander to the proclivities of wealth
and privilege. Too much is at stake-the entire socio-political
fabric of human existence. Who is mommy and who is daddy?, to
be exact. Careless violation of the fundamental cell of an organ-
ism can wreak havoc. That may be as true of the organism of the
body politic as it is of the body physical.
On February 3, 1988 the Supreme Court of the State of New
Jersey unanimously overturned Judge Sorkow's decision on most
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points.8 The Justices awarded custody of the baby to the Sterns
based upon the length of time she had lived with them and the
bonds that have consequently been formed by the baby with them,
recognizing "the unfortunate error" made by Judge Sorkow in
having awarded custody to the Sterns in his decision, but conced-
ing that they are now stuck with the results of that error and must
go on from there. They restored Mrs. Whitehead's maternal
rights; voided the adoption by Mrs. Stern; found the contract inva-
lid, possibly criminal; and recognized that what had occurred was
baby-selling, pure and simple, or at the very least, the sale of a
mother's custodial rights to her baby, in clear violation of "public
policy." The court, however, did not take the logical next step of
recognizing that "baby-selling" (which infers "baby-owning") is a
form of "person-selling," (which infers "person-owning") a vital
and integral part of the slavery that was outlawed by the Constitu-
tion. It virtually invited the legislature to step in and create laws
that would regulate "surrogacy" arrangements. Many states are
currently considering such legislation, all of which would, in ef-
fect, regulate the practice of contracting for the production,
purchase and sale of infant human beings. Since the thirteenth
amendment clearly outlawed the trafficking in human flesh such
legislation contemplates, all of these laws would be unconstitu-
tional prior to their inception. These bodies would appear to be
pondering how to regulate the illegal.
Unfortunately, neither the Sterns nor Mrs. Gould (formerly
Mrs. Whitehead) wish to appeal to the United States Supreme
Court. Sooner or later, though, and preferably as soon as possible,
a test case should be brought before the United States Supreme
Court to determine whether the thirteenth amendment, barring
the contracting for, purchasing and selling of human merchandise,
will be enforced.
In an ironic repetition of history, Judge Sorkow's decision
may still be hailed as Solomonic, as Chief Justice Taney's Dred
Scott 9 decision was lauded by many. Like the Baby M decision, it
too sought to decide human issues without recourse to human real-
ity. Chief Justice Taney's decision led directly to Fort Sumter.
Where will Judge Sorkow's decision lead? "The evil that men do
lives after them; The good is oft interred with their bones; So let
it be with Caesar." 10 So, God help us, if it be with Sorkow.
8. In re Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988).
9. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
10. Marc Antony's eulogy at the funeral of Julius Caesar. William Shakespeare,
Julius Caesar, act 3, sc. 2.

